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i. INTRODUCTION

The complexity of modern civilization has added a new dimension
to the age old problem and tension between freedom and restraint. Under
constitutional government the courts are called upon to resolve tensions
that exist between the rights of the individual and the legitimate needs
and welfare of society. Legal cases involving freedom of speech, freedom
of religion, subversive activity, and criminal due process provide eloquent
and vital material on the constitutional rights of man in modern society.
The problem of licensing of occupations involves questions of constitutional and administrative law which affect large numbers of persons in
their every-day lives. The licensing problem is not likely to arouse as much
general interest in the minds of the public at large as are the constitutional issues mentioned above. Nevertheless this problem by its mere
quantitative importance deserves one's attention.
A license has been defined as "a permit to do a certain thing; it
confers a right to do that which without the license would be unlawful."
Three questions present themselves. First, does the legislature have the
power to license a particular occupation? Second, assuming that the legislature has the power to license an occupation, to what extent can this
power be delegated to subordinate licensing officials, and in what manner can it be exercised? Third, what changes in Colorado's licensing
statutes should be recommended?

1I. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER To LICENSE
A Wisconsin judge in 1941 expressed alarm at a certain piece of
legislation, which, if sustained, would mean that "we have taken a long
1 Gronert v. People, 95 Colo. 508, 51], 37 P.2d 396, 398 (1934);
Colo. 489, 493, 39 Pac. 341, 342 (1895).

People v. Raims, 20
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step in becoming a nation of licensees instead of a nation of free men."'
The legislature cannot license at will, but the purpose of the licensing
must le connected in some way to the public's health, safety, welfare, or
morals. It must le necessary or desirable in one of these spheres of the
public interest.
In Colorado as elsewhere it is obvious that the licensing of the professions is well within the state's licensing power. The activity of a
professional man not only affects those with whom he deals directly,
but it affects the public as a whole. An unqualified or dishonest lawyer
injures not only his clients and specific adversaries, but he also pollutes
the stream of justice. A professional man requires special knowledge
and skills; the exercise of these attributes can be rightly regulated in the
public interest and welfare. The Colorado Supreme Court has declared
that there is no absolute property right to engage in such professions as
law, medicine, and dentistry.' But of course that list is not exclusive
and the increase in technology will probably see the list expanded.
In protecting the public health and moral the legislature itself,
or a municipality through a grant of power from the legislature, has the
right to license such institutions as hospitals, taverns, and even dance
halls where only soft drinks are served.' It cannot be reasonably maintained that licensing poses a problem of over-regulation in this area, and
the legislative power here seems to be certain.
The above situations are clear. It is when one enters the field of
semi-skilled trades that the question ef whether or not the licensing of
an occupation is within the police power becomes more difficult to
answer. Of course, one can always search for a reason why a certain occupation bears some relationship to the health, safety, welfare, or morals
of the public. But the courts demand somcthing more t'han this-the
relationship must be reasonable and real, and not merely a fiction. The
North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the licensing of tile contractors in a ringing opinion which declared, "The Act in question here
has as its main and controlling purpose, not health, not safety, not morals,
not welfare, but a tight control of tile contracting in perpetuity by those
already in the business .... .. ' Statutes in other states licensing such
persons as photographers,' and real estate brokers7 have been declared
unconstitutional as bearing no reasonable relationship to the police
power.
interestingly enough, no Colorado case has invalidated the licensing
of any occupation as such. The right to license plumbers,' pawnbrokers,'
and barbers" impliedly has been upheld. There is no statewide statutory
requirement for the licensing of cleaners and dyers, but the act regulating their practices, which is in effect indirect licensing, has been declared constitutional.'" This would seem to indicate that the Colorado
2 State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85, 294 N.WV. 796 (1940), rehearing denied, 237 Wis. 108,
296 N.W. 622 (1941).
3 People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pa.
928 (1929), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 566 (1929).
4 Dwyer v. People, 82 Colo. 574, 261 Pae. S58 (1927); Downes v. McClellan, 72 Colo.
904, 210 Pac. 397 (1922).
v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 525, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (1957).
'Roller
* State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938).
7 State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
s People v. Rogers, 74 Coio. 184, 219 Pac. 1076 (1923).
•) Provident Loan Society v. Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac. 10 (1918).
10 Denver v. Schmid, 98 Colo. 32, 52 P.2d 388 (1935).
11 People ex rel. Attorney General v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939).
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Supreme Court has not felt compelled to seek too far for a reason to
connect an occupation, in some way, to the safety, health, welfare, or
morals of the public. The court has declared that even the public financial safety is a legitimate concern of' the police power."a That being so,
the court would probably uphold the validity of the legislative power
to license real estate brokers and salesmen, sectIrities dealers, insurance
agents and brokers, and occupations of a similar nature.
Though the court has been liberal in finding that occupations are
properly subject to the police power of the state, it has been strict in
determining which occupations the legislature or the municipalities
have intended to be licensed. Thus it has been held that a municipal
ordinance requiring the licensing of insurance brokers does not apply
to insurance agents." Similarly, a licensed engineer will not be allowed to
exercise the privileges accorded to architects.'
It can be seen that a
narrow construction applied to the stattutorv deflinition of an occupation
will cut both ways as it affects the licensee. In one case he cannot be
licensed at all and need not be since he falls outside the definition. But
neither can one expand his occupational definition to include more than
that afforded by the statute.
Another basic principle of licensing occupations is that the requirements imposed treat all persons within the class alike." Likewise arbitrary and discriminatory license fees are invalid." A Denver ordinance,
for example, required every coal dealer to put up a $1000 bond or give
evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to pay for any damages
arising out of the operation of his business. It further required a license
fee of $100 for the operation of one office within Denver and for one
truck, and $5 for each additional truck. No license would be issued
unless the coal dealer maintained an office in Denver. The court struck
(town the ordinance on the ground that it was discriminatory against
coal dealers whose establishments were located outside of Denver. The
court further declared that the ordinance had been passed for the sole
benefit of Denver coal merchants.'"
But in applying this rule against non-discrimination, the court has
been perfectly willing to give a narrow construction to the class enumerated in the statute or ordinance. Thus a statute requiring money
lenders whose interest rates were above 12% to obtain a license was not
held to be discriminatory even thCough the statute did not apply to banks,
trust companies, building and loan associations, or title and guarantee
associations. These latter groups' interest rates were lower than 12%
and they were already subject to governmental supervision.' Similarly,
a Denver ordinance pro%idling that each gasoline filling station would be
required to pay an annual iense fee ci $25 for one gasoline dispenser
Plus a $10 license fee for each additional dispenser was upheld as not
being discriminatory even though garages which had gasoline dispensers
were not required to pay the license fee.'- It is permissible to recognize
a distinction between dispensers at filling stations and those in garages.
'a"
Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 124, P.2d 593 (1942); cf. United States Building
ind Loan Ass'n. v. McClelland. 95 Colo. 292, 36 P2d 164 (1934).
12 Bernheimer v. Leadville, 14 Colo. 518, 24 Pac. 332 (1890).
13 Heron v. Denver, 131 Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955).
14 Houston v. Kirschwing, 117 Colo. 92, 184 P.2d 487 (1947); 33 Am. Jur., Licenses
2 30 (1942).
15 Ibid.
16 Houston v. Kirschwing. Note 14 supra.
17 Cavanaugh v. People, 61 Colo. 292, 157 Pac. 200 (1916).
S Hollenbeck v. Denver, 97 Colo. 370, 49 P.2d 435 (1935).
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The former are essential in a separate and distinct business, while tile
latter are merely incidental to the primary operation. Tile classes, therefore, are separate and there is no discrimination when the filling station
operator must pay the fee and the garage man need not.
Ill. DELEGATION OF LEGISIATIVE POWER
To some the doctrine against the delegation of legislative power
seems outworn. It has been said that it is little more than a judicial
corollary of laissez-faire which is no longer suited to the needs of the
positive conception of government." Harold Laski wrote that he would
see the delegation extended rather than grudgingly conceded. 2 ' In 1916
Elihu Root, then president of the American Bar Association, asserted
that "tile old doctrine of prohibiting the delegation of legislative power
has virtually retired from tile field and given up the fight."' Root proved
to be too pessimistic in his prognostication. The prohibition against
delegation continues to be a well respected judicial concept which remains firmly entrenched in our law.
It might be argued that state courts merely pay "lip service" to the
doctrine, but then go on to hold that the particular legislation in cuestion does not involve delegation, or if it does, it is not of such a kind
that violates the essence of the doctrine. It is, of course, true that most
contested legislation has been upheld. But such a fact should not lead
one to the erroneous conclusion that the non-delegation doctrine is dying.
It continues to assert its vigor.
The doctrine is fairly easy to describe; its interpretation and application in a particular fact situation is often difficult. The prohibition
against the delegation of legislative power is a corollary of the separation
of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial functions. To use Mr.
Justice Holmes's terms, the distinctions and functions of each branchof the government cannot be divided into "watertight compartments."'
A certain blending is inevitable. But still each branch mLust (IOits own
job and not encroach upon the functions of the other branches nor abdicate its roles to the others. The legislative is to legislate, that is, to declare the policies and make the law. The executive is to execute. Here
arises the age old problem-where to draw the distinction and the line
between what is legislating and what is administering. The administrative body must only act within the authority delegated to it by the legislature under standards clearly fixed by law; it has no discretion to
declare what the law is. 2 '
One of Colorado's earliest cases on the delegation problem was Colorado and Southern Railway v. State Railroad Commission.-" There the
court held that the authority granted to the commission to prescribe
reasonable time schedules for the operation of trains and to prevent
unreasonable discrimination between commnities with respect to railroad service was not an invalid delegation of legislative power. Other
Colorado cases have upheld the power of the Industrial Commission to
determine "prevailing standards of working hours and conditions in
19 Davis, Administrative Law, p. 58 (1951).
20 Report on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060, p. 137 (1936) quoted in Jaffe, An Essay
on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 375 (1947).
21 41 A.B.A.R. 355, 368-369 (1916).
22 Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
23 Union Pacific v. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm., 131 Colo, 528, 284 P.2d 242
(1955).
24 54 Colo. 64, 129 Pac. 506 (1912).
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the printing industry" in order that those contracting with the state tor

printing should observe them, - 5 the right of tile Industrial Commission
to set minimum prices for tile cleaning and dyeing trade,'-; and the right
of certain administrative bodies to determine and prescribe reorganized
boundaries for school districts.21 Colorado's Industrial Recovery Act 21
was declared unconstitutional upon the basis of the Schechter case,"
and the Melon Inspection Act"° was struck down isinvolving improper
delegation, the court saying, "It cannot be said that the work of inspecting melons is of such a technical nature or so intricate that it cannot be
prescribed by definite rules, specifications, classifications and standards.'",

When it comes to the licensing problem as such, the Colorado Snprenle Court has insisted upon definite standards. In Prouty v. Heron,"
the plaintiff had been licensed to practice engineering in 1921. He thereafter left the state and returned in 1945. At that time he applied for a
registration card as a professional engineer. He was given a card which
stated that he was qualified to practice civil engineering. Plaintiff protested the limitation and requested a license without the civil engineering
classification, but his request was refused. The statute' :' which regulated
the licensing of engineers did not define any of the branches of engineering which it enumerated. There were no standards in the act which
could be applied in determining the distinctions to be drawn between
them. The statute on that count alone would have been objectionable,
but there were other flaws as well. A professional engineer had to have
completed an approved engineering curriculum of four or more years,
or have been graduated from a school or college approved by the Board
as of satisfactory standing. An applicant had to have an additional four
or more years of experience in engineering work of a character satisfactory to the Board and in its discretion the Board might give credit not in
excess of one year for satisfactory graduate study in engineering. The
Smith-Brooks Printing Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 204, 85 P.2d 39, 41 (1938).
26 People ex rel. Attorney General v. B3arksdale, supra.
'7 Hazlet v. Gaunt, 126 Colo. 385, 250 P.2d 188 (1952).
28 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1935, c. 89.
29 In
re Interrogatories of the Governor, 97 Colo. 52S, 51 P.2d 695 (1935).
See also
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
29 Colo. Laxs
1st ]leg. Sess. 1925, c. 95, amended by Colo. Laws 1st ]leg. Sess.
1927. c. 101.
31 People v. Stanley, 90 Colo. 315. 318, 9 P.2d 288, 289 (1932).
32 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
:3 Colo. Laws 1st ]leg. Sess. 1951, c. 161.
25
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court rightly declared that there had been an unwarranted delegation
of authority to the Board.' Prouty is the only Colorado case in which a
licensing statute has been invalidated by application of the non-delegation doctrine.
In Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners"' the State Board
of Medical Examiners attempted to revoke a physician's license claiming
that he had violated a section of the statute that prohibited advertising
relative to any of the sexual organs. In a four-three decision the court
held the revocation was void on the ground of statutory uncertainty. In
Spears Hospital v. State Board of Health" the State Board issued a "temporary provisional license" which contained five conditions: namely,
that Spears Hospital would not receive maternity cases, that surgery
would not be performed, that drugs and mledicines would not be administered, that no contagious or infectious cases would be admitted or
treated, and finally that the name "hospital" would not be used in describing the institution. The court declared that the Board had usurped
the function of the legislature and set tip its own law in attempting to
issue, and later in attempting to revoke, a "temporary provisional license."
Nothing in the statute 17 or in the rules and regulations of the Board
authorized such a procedure. It certainly could not be justified on the
grounds of legitimate administrative discretion.
In State Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle, " however, the court
said the power to revoke a license includes within it the power to suspend,
and thus the court corrected a mistaken assumption by the State Board
that it either must acquit a dentist charged with unprofessional conduct
or revoke his license. The court remanded the case in order that the
Board might consider the advisability of suspension rather than outright
revocation. This case also contained a rather uncertain dictum which
appeared to recognize a distinction between unprofessional conduct and
unethical conduct, implying that the latter was outside the regulatory
reach of the statute." It is seen, then, that even in the field of health,
where the courts have traditionally been more liberal in upholding administrative discretion, the Colorado Supreme Court has allowed only
the most obvious interpretation of the statutory authority conferred upon
the licensing officials.
Municipal bodies cannot enact licensing ordinances which prohibit
what already has been authorized by- the state, 0 but a municipality in
the exercise of its police powers can exact requirements in addition to
those imposed by the state."
In summarizing the court's constitutional attitude toward the licensing of professions and occupations, it is evident that it has been
generally liberal in finding justification for the existence of the power
to license. On the other hand the court has been very careful to see that
the exercise of that power is well within the statutory authorization, and
if the legislature has not been careful to provide canalized standards,
the statute will be invalidated.
Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
3557 Colo. 74, 141 Pac. 132 (1914).
36 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872 (1950).
37 Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 78, § 133-138 (1935).
38 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.2d 693 (1932).
39 Id. at 186.
40 Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
41 Provident Loan Society v. Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 P
34

10 (1918).
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The present engineer's licensing statute" would appear to have
corrected the deficiencies noted in the Prouty case by providing definitive standards. On the other hand, for example, the licensing statute ' :
for children's boarding homes and placement agencies would very likely
be declared unconstitutional if tested in the courts. There is nothing in
this latter statute to suggest by what standards the Board of Standards
of Child Care is to determine that a foster boarding home is "suitable""
or that a placement agency is "competent and has adequate facilities.""
The board is also authorized to suspend or revoke any license issued in
the event that "minimum standards" are not maintained."' it can be
cogently argued that there is no reason why the legislature cannot delineate the standards by which the State Board of Standards for Child Care
is to be governed in the issuance o1 licenses to children's boarding homes
and placement agencies. CerItainly the subject ol foster children and
42 Colo Rev. Stat. § 51-1-12 (1953).
4.3Colo. 1-ev. S'tat. § 22-12-1 to § 22-12-7 (1953).

,-Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-12-2 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-12-4 (1953).
4o Ibid.
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their welfare admits little justification for tile delegation of wide discretionary power to a non-legislative body.
A statute upon which there has been no litigation is that dealing
with weather control.' 7 Here in a nutshell the problem of the delegation
cf legislative power comes into focus. A licensed person or corporation
who engages in weather control or cloud modification operations must
have "financial responsibility adequate to meet obligations reasonably
likely to be attached to or result from weather control activities," and
must have the "skill and experience reasonably necessary to the accomplishinent of weather control without actionable injury to property or
person.'.. What is financial responsibility? A $1000 bond deposited with
tic weather control commission? Assets worth $1,000,000? lVhat standards are to govern what a "reasonably likely" result from weather activities is to be? What criteria are to be used in ascertaining whether an
applicanit has the skill and experience "reasonably necessary"? More
uncanalized delegation of power can hardly be imagined.
But to what extent can the legislature intelligently prescribe standards within which the licensing authority can operate? Broad open-end
qualifications such as exist in the weather control statute force the commission to legislate even if' it does not desire to do so. It is easy to see
why new developments will cause the non-delegation problem to grow
rather than to lessen. But perhaps one helpful principle can be gleaned
from the decisions of the Colorado cCurt. In the exercise of delegated
powers, doubts should be resolved against the one exercising that power,
and in favor of the licensee. This is, of course, a general principle of
free government wherein that government is to exist for the benefit of
the citizen.
IV. CHANGES IN COLORADn

LICENSING STATUTES

It is beyond the scope of this note to engage in a discussion of the
procedural aspects of licensing in Colorado. A brief comment, however,
will perhaps be helpful. A cursory glance at a handful of Colorado's
statutes on licensing will reveal a senseless lack of uniformity. The licensing statute governing acccuntants specifically provides for a court
review of the board's action in revoking a license. In the event the board
is reversed, all costs are to be paid by it.'" But the statute on architects
is silent about a judicial review, though it has not been denied there
5
"
can be one. It takes a unanimous vote to revoke an architect's license, '
but only a majority vote to revoke one belonging to an engineer." An
architect can be fined no more than $200 for practicing without a license,'" but an unlicensed accountant may have to pay up to $500 and
spend a year in jail.'" N\hy should the State Board of Barber Examiners
receive $16 per day for each of its members in addition to traveling ex17 Colo. i-ev. Stat. § 1.50-1-1 to § 150-1-14 (1953).
4s Colo. Ilev. Stot. § 150-1-8 (1953).
49 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-1-19(5) (1953).
50 See Linder v. Copeland, 320 P.2d 972 (Colo., 1958). The Colorado Supreme Court
in affirming a flnver District ('onrt decision which ordered the issuance of a license
to an architect whose application had been denied twenty-four hours after being received, severely condemned the arbitrary and capricious action of the State Board of
Examiners of Architects.
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-1-17 (1953).
52 Colo. R-ev. Stat. § 51-1-19 (1953).
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-1-15 (1953).
54Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-1-17 (1953).
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penses," while members of the State Board of Accountancy receive "no
more" than $10 per day and traveling expenses, " and while members
of the State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers receive no
compensation, but only traveling, incidental, and clerical expenses? "
The examples in the disparity in the various licensing statutes could be
multiplied considerably.
Colorado has not yet adopted a uniform procedure act for the
creation and procedure of licensing boards and commissions. There
appears to be no reason why it should not do so. Legislation of this kind,
cOulpled with the supreme court's insistence Upon proper standards within
which licensing authorities are to operate, should go far in reducing
substantive confusion and procedural uncertainty that potentially exists
in many o1 our present licensing statutes.
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-1-4 (1953).
56 Colo. lex. Stat. § 2-1-1 (1953).
,7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 51-1-5 (1953).
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